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PRIORITIZATION ANDMUTUALIZATION:
CLEARINGHOUSES AND THE REDUNDANCY
OF THE BANKRUPTCY SAFE HARBORS
Adam J. Levitin*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues for the repeal of the bankruptcy safe harbors for
financial contracts because they are redundant systemic risk safeguards.
Most systemically important types of financial contracts now clear through
clearinghouses. Clearinghouses are a superior method to the safe harbors
for protecting the liquidity of systemically important money substitutes and
do not subordinate bankruptcy policy concerns to systemic risk concerns.
Clearinghouses are a better guaranty against systemic disruption than the
safe harbors because they can absorb the losses caused by insolvencies and
fire sales due to their deep capital and lack of leverage. Moreover,
clearinghouses reduce systemic risk by forcing internalization of systemic
externalities on the finance industry through loss mutualization. This
reduces the industrh4* incentive to engage in excessively risky transactions.
And, in the event that losses overwhelm clearinghouses, they are
technically and politically easier to bail out than individual firms when the
safe harbors prove inadequate. Accordingly, this Article argues for the safe
harbors to be replaced with a clearing mandate only for those types of
highly liquid financial contracts that serve as money substitutes.
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INTRODUCTION
When a firm fails who will bear the losses? Two basic methods of loss
allocation appear in a variety of insolvency systems: prioritization and
mutualization. Prioritization places creditors in a senior-subordinate priority
structure that concentrates losses on a subset of the junior creditors, leaving
the senior creditors unimpaired. Mutualization, in contrast, eschews a
priority structure and allocates losses on a pro rata basis.
United States bankruptcy law allocates losses using a mixture of
prioritization and mutualization. The starting point of bankruptcy law is that
Nequity is equality8 and indeed, the default loss allocation in the
Bankruptcy Code is pro rata distribution among creditors. But the
Bankruptcy Code also countenances numerous deviations from this
principle. Bankruptcy law prioritizes a range of types of claims in different
ways: recognition of contractual priority; provision of statutory priority;
recognition of rights in collateral; and exception from the automatic stay
and avoidance actions. Among these different types of prioritization, the
most extreme is automatic exception from the automatic stay and insulation
from avoidance actions.1 Such treatment allows a creditor to seize collateral
or exercise setoff rights to satisfy its claim through closeout netting. 2
Because these hyper-prioritized creditors are not subject to the automatic
stay, they get first Ndibs8 on the debtor4s assets, while other creditors have
to wait in line and then fight for the remaining scraps.
This extreme prioritization is granted only to one category of claims:
financial contracts. Swaps, repos, securities contracts, forward contracts
(including both contracts for physical delivery and commodities futures),
and master netting agreements are all types of financial contracts that are
exempt from the automatic stay, at least for purposes of accelerating,
terminating, and liquidating the claims.3 These types of financial contracts
are also exempt from most avoidance actions, so transfers made to the
debtor4s counterparties under these contracts cannot be clawed back into the
bankruptcy estate as voidable preferences or constructive fraudulent
transfers.4
The standard policy justification for the special treatment of financial
contracts is that impairment of these contracts poses a systemic risk because
1. The automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012), is a cornerstone of bankruptcy law that en-
joins most attempts to collect from the bankruptcy estate outside of the bankruptcy process. Bank-
ruptcy law also permits the avoidance of certain pre-kl0I+(-)Th )+l0*OQ+* /O )LQ SQk)/+4* -+/-Q+)ha
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547R548.
2. Closeout netting is the process of netting out the transactions between a defaulting firm and
l 0/0SQOl(H)K0M OK+2 K0)/ l *K0MHQ 0Q) -lh2Q0)a !H/*Q/() 0Q))K0M +QS(TQ* )LQ 0/0SQOl(H)K0M OK+24*
credit exposure to the defaulting firm from gross exposure to net exposure.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b), 555R557, 559R561.
4. See id. § 546(e)R(g), (j).
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of the interconnected nature of the financial system.5 According to this
argument, imposing delays on payment or allowing the debtor to cherry-
pick which contracts to performPas would occur without the special
treatment for financial contractsPwould pose liquidity and even solvency
threats to the debtor4s counterparties and roil financial markets.6
Existing scholarship strongly criticizes the bankruptcy treatment of
financial contracts. Some scholars have questioned whether the special
treatment actually serves its intended purpose. 7 Although the scholarly
literature largely accepts the systemic risk reduction benefit of bankruptcy
Hlj4* special treatment of financial contracts, the literature criticizes the
treatment as poorly tailored, because special treatment covers more than
systemically important contracts.8 The existing literature points toward a
need to narrow the definitions of prioritized financial contracts in the
Bankruptcy Code. But implicit in the existing HK)Q+l)(+Q4* critique is that
special treatment of systemically important contracts is merited to the
extent that it prevents systemic risk.
This Article departs from the existing literature to argue for the
complete elimination of the special bankruptcy treatment for all types of
financial contracts. There is a better way to address the systemic stability
concerns: mandating the use of clearinghouses as systemic shock absorbers
for those types of transactions that function as money substitutes and thus
5. Edward Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code:
Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
641, 660 (2005).
6. See, e.g., David Mengle, The Importance of Close-Out Netting 4R5 (ISDA Res. Notes, No.
1, 2010), http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Netting-ISDAResearchNotes-1-2010.pdf.
7. See Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 92 (2005) (arguing that safe harbors may
actually increase systemic risk by encouraging runs on the debtor); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the
Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319 (2010) (arguing for the repeal of the safe harbors
because they actually increase systemic risk by encouraging runs on the debtor); Mark J. Roe, The
7'>!6E:!6'< JE>Z':1< 2ERB'A: 2>!@>!:!'< E< U!AEA+!EX 9>!<!< =++'X'>E:@>, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539
(2011) (arguing that safe harbors increase systemic risk by reducing counterparty incentives to
monitor).
8. See Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special
Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2009) (arguing for limiting the safe harbors to Chapter 7
cases); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., .#' ;EAZ>8?:+R 9@)'1< /E%' QE>C@>< %@> /'::X'B'A: 2ERB'A:<
and Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, 49 TEX. INT4L L.J. 245, 254R58 (2014)
(arguing for a narrowing of the automatic stay exception and avoidance action safe harbors);
Morrison & Riegel, supra note 5 (noting the potential overbreadth of the definition of financial
contracts); Edward Morrison, Mark J. Roe, & Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo
Safeharbors, 69 BUS. L. 1015 (2014) (arguing for limited repeal of repo safe harbors); David A.
Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 156R57 (2012) (proposing narrower prioritization of certain financial
contracts). See also Bryan G. Faubus, Note, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for
Derivatives to Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801 (2010). Stephen Schwarcz and Ori Sharon
are affirmatively agnostic about the systemic risk reduction benefit, and instead emphasize the
path-dependent nature of the treatment of financial contracts. See Stephen L. Schwarcz & Ori
Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1753R54 (2014).
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raise systemic risk concerns from illiquidity or credit impairment.9 Because
the money supply is the lubricant of all commerce, any impairment of
instruments that function as money threatens broad disruptions in the
economy. These impairments undermine confidence in the money supply
and thus inject a hard-to-price risk into all transactions, making it difficult
for parties to come to terms.
Many types of financial contracts already clear through clearinghouses,
which stand in the shoes of their members to formally assume the
counterparty payment risk on cleared contracts. Clearinghouses represent an
efficient risk transfer mechanism, because clearinghouse capital structures
function to aggregate the capital of their members into a mutual firm with
much greater ability to absorb losses than any individual member firm. The
liquidity and solvency concerns faced by an individual firm upon its
counterparty4s bankruptcy are simply lesser threats to a clearinghouse.
The use of clearinghouses is not generally required by public law;
instead, their use is a private market-driven development. The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
however, mandates the use of clearinghouses for most swap contracts.10 To
date, the scholarly literature has not worked through the implication of the
Dodd-Frank Act4s swap clearing requirement on the treatment of financial
contracts in bankruptcy. The Dodd-Frank Act entirely undermines the
systemic risk justification for the special bankruptcy treatment of financial
contracts by pointing to a better way to address systemic risk, namely
mandating the use of clearinghouses for those systemically important
classes of contracts. With the use of clearinghouses as a systemic shock
absorber, prioritization of financial contracts in bankruptcy becomes
redundant and therefore can be eliminated without raising systemic risk
concerns. There is no need for a belt-and-suspenders approach to systemic
risk when one of the approaches is widely recognized as impeding other
important policies and may well be ineffective at reducing systemic risk.
This Article argues that clearinghouse mutualization is a preferable
method of addressing systemic risk than bankruptcy prioritization.
Mutualization aggregates the capital of the financial services industry,
9. Stephen D. Adams has made a parallel argument that the Orderly Liquidation Authority in
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act renders the special
treatment of financial contracts in bankruptcy superfluous. Stephen D. Adams, Safe Harbors in
Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank: A Structural Analysis, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 91, 94 (2014).
Adams, however, only calls for limiting the special treatment, not for eliminating it, and the
regulatory implementation of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act may well incorporate similar
prioritization of financial contracts. Id. at 119R20.
10. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1682, 1762 (2010)
(codified, respectively, at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) and 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3 (2012)). The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are
empowered to exempt certain types of swaps from the clearing requirement. Id. Derivative-market
participants are also subject to capital and margin requirements. Id. §§ 731, 764 (codified, respec-
tively, at 7 U.S.C. § 6s and 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(e) (2012)).
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which makes for a much stronger bastion against systemic failures than the
capital of any single firm and reflects the interconnectedness of the
financial services industry. Mutualization also spreads losses according to
the scale of risk-producing activity, thereby forcing an internalization of
systemic externalities.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a discrete set of policy reforms: first,
elimination of all special treatment in bankruptcy for all financial contracts;
second, requirement of the use of clearinghouses for the subset of financial
contracts that are systemically important, the universe of which corresponds
with those susceptible to centralized clearing (i.e., highly liquid money
substitutes); and lastly, creation of a more robust regulatory system for
clearinghouses themselves to ensure that they are a source of strength, not a
locus of risk in the financial system. In other words, there should be no safe
harbors for any financial contracts, but use of clearinghouses should be
mandated for those money-substitute contracts whose liquidity needs to be
protected to prevent against systemic shocks.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the
concepts of loss N-+K/+K)Kgl)K/08 l0S loss N2()(lHKgl)K/08 l* two alternative
approaches to allocating the losses resulting from the failure of a firm,
either concentrating losses on a subset of creditors or spreading them
among all creditors. As Part I explains, different loss allocation systems
emphasize one approach or the other, but typically involve some
combination of prioritization and mutualization. In particular, bankruptcy
law emphasizes prioritization, while private transaction clearinghouses
emphasize mutualization. Part II examines the special prioritized treatment
of financial contracts in bankruptcy (safe harbors) that is designed to reduce
)LQ *h*)Q2KT +K*I +Q*(H)K0M O+/2 OK+2*4 OlKH(+Q*a 7LQ *lOQ Ll+k/+*4
effectiveness at reducing systemic risk has been trenchantly questioned, and
critics have also observed that the safe harbors are overly broad for their
purposes, encourage overextensions of credit, and undermine bankruptcy
policy goals of furthering reorganization. Part III points to the Dodd-Frank
#T)4* swap clearing mandate to argue that clearinghouses perform the same
systemic risk mitigation function as the bankruptcy safe harbors for
financial contracts, but without the undesirable effects of the safe harbors
on credit markets and the bankruptcy process. Accordingly, Part III argues
for replacing the safe harbors with a clearing requirement for all classes of
systemically important contracts.
I. PRIORITIZATION ANDMUTUALIZATION
Firms fail. Failure is an unavoidable fact of business life. A range of
private and public regimes exist to address the allocation of losses upon a
firm4s failure, depending on the type of firm (e.g., depository, insurance
company, credit union, broker-dealer, railroad, or other type of business
entity). Some of these regimes concentrate losses on an individual creditor
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or creditors (prioritization), thereby ensuring that the failed firm4s assets are
used to repay )LQ OK+24* other, prioritized creditors. For example, private-
label securitizations feature cash-flow waterfalls that allocate realized losses
in a senior-subordinate structure that concentrates losses initially on a first-
loss tranche, then, when that tranche is wiped out, on a second-loss tranche,
etc. Other regimes spread the lossesPand assets available for repaymentP
among all creditors (mutualization). In its simplest form, the partners in a
general partnership will realize losses on a pro rata basis, absent some other
agreement.
Prioritization and mutualization have different effects on voluntary
T+QSK)/+*4 Qi l0)Q K0TQ0)K'Q*a Z0 l -(+Q -+K/+K)Kgl)K/0 *h*)Q2, losses are
concentrated on some creditors. Those creditors who bear concentrated risk
have greater incentives to take care when extending credit because they
could potentially bear 100% of the losses. As a result, their risk-adjusted
pricing will affect the total amount of credit extended to the debtor.
The flip side of this is that creditors with high priority who are unlikely
to bear losses have less incentive to be cautious when extending credit and
may overextend credit because the risk is borne first by other parties.11
Accordingly, creditors in a pure prioritization system will price their
extensions of credit based on where they fit within the priority structure, but
at least for contractual creditors, there are parties properly incentivized to
impose market discipline on the debtor. Yet such a prioritization system is
poorly suited for a world with involuntary creditors (such as tort victims
and tax authorities) and nonadjusting voluntary creditors. In the presence of
such involuntary and nonadjusting creditors, a prioritization system will not
ensure optimal market discipline on extensions of credit.
Ex ante incentives for disciplined extensions of credit work differently
in a pure mutualization system. Z0 l -(+Q 2()(lHKgl)K/0 *h*)Q2c T+QSK)/+*4
incentives for taking care at the time of extending credit are reduced
because losses will be shared with other creditors. Thus, pure mutualization
creates a moral hazard that encourages excessive extension of credit. As a
result, most loss allocation regimes feature a combination of prioritization
and mutualization in an attempt to capture the best qualities of each system
of loss allocation.
A. PRIORITIZATION ANDMUTUALIZATION IN THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE
The default treatment of claims in bankruptcy is one of mutualization.
In Chapter 7, all timely filed general unsecured claims are paid on a pro rata
11. These incentives may OHK- l* l SQk)/+4* K0*/H'Q0Th kQT/2Q* 2/+Q HKIQHhPthe junior
creditors who are more likely to end up out of the money may, like equity holders, agitate for
higher-risk, higher-return strategies for the debtor, while the more senior creditors may monitor
the debtor more closely as it becomes more likely that they will bear losses.
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basis. 12 Chapter 11 mandates pro rata treatment within each class of
creditors13 and requires either a majority vote of each impaired class of
creditors or that there be no Nunfair discrimination8 between classes of
creditors.14 The mutualization norm is reinforced by the automatic stay,15
which prevents creditors from jumping ahead of others by proceeding with
collection outside (or inside) of the bankruptcy court process. Other
Bankruptcy Code provisionsPsuch as disallowing unmatured interest, 16
preserving avoided transfers and liens for the benefit of the estate, 17
prohibiting the attachment of security interests to post-petition after-
acquired property,18 and disallowing the attachment of security interests to
post-petition proceeds, products, offspring, profits, and hotel and lodging
rents and fees19Pall further ensure that some creditors do not jump ahead
of others in the bankruptcy process absent a showing of cause and
procedural protections.
The various bankruptcy avoidance actionsPactions to avoid certain
prepetition transfersPalso reinforce the mutualization norm. For example,
the bankruptcy estate can avoid preferential transfers 20 and preferential
setoff rights.21 Avoidance of pre-bankruptcy preferences emphasizes the
idea that equity is equality. A preference is defined as a transfer that enables
the transferee to fare better than it would in a hypothetical Chapter 7
bankruptcy than it would fare without the transfer. 22 Likewise, the
bankruptcy estate can avoid transfers for which the insolvent debtor did not
receive reasonably equivalent value,23 or which were made with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 24 Such fraudulent transfers enable
creditor transferees to do better than if they had dealt with the debtor on
arm4s length terms and thus are contrary to the equality principle in the
mutualization norm. Similarly, the bankruptcy estate can avoid unperfected
transfers under the strong-arm power.25 A general unsecured creditor would
not have had notice of such avoidable transfers and would thus not have
been able to adjust accordingly. Avoidance of such transfers again
reinforces the equality principle.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2012).
13. Id. § 1123(a)(4).
14. Id. § 1129.
15. Id. § 362(a).
16. Id. § 502(b)(2).
17. Id. § 551.
18. Id. § 552(a).
19. Id. § 552(b)(1)R(2).
20. Id. § 547.
21. Id. § 553(b).
22. Id. §§ 547(b)(5), 553(a)(3).
23. Id. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B).
24. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
25. Id. § 544(a).
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Yet for all of the provisions in bankruptcy law that create a
mutualization background, there is a significant prioritization overlay. First,
bankruptcy law recognizes priorities granted by non-bankruptcy law. Thus,
creditors4 liquidation priority over equity is recognized, as are the
liquidation preferences of any preferred equity interests. 26 Likewise,
bankruptcy law recognizes security interests that are perfected under
applicable non-bankruptcy law27and statutory liens.28 Similarly, bankruptcy
law recognizes contractual subordination agreements,29 setoff rights,30 and
reclamation rights. 31 Second, bankruptcy law creates its own federal
statutory priorities for certain claims, both pre- and post-petition.32 Third,
bankruptcy law creates functional priorities for creditors whose executory
contracts and unexpired leases are assumed by requiring cure of monetary
defaults prior to assumption.33 These creditors4 prepetition claims get paid
in full and prior to the effective date of a plan or a liquidation. Finally,
bankruptcy law creates functional priorities for creditors through exemption
from the automatic stay34 and avoidance actions.35
Bankruptcy4s treatment of financial contractsPswaps, repos, securities
contracts, commodities futures contracts, forward contracts, and master
netting agreementsPis entirely one of prioritization. All of these types of
financial contracts (which are defined broadly) are exempt from the
automatic stay, at least for purposes of the debtor4s counterparties4
acceleration, termination, and liquidation of their claims. 36 Financial
contract counterparties may also offset any collateral posted by the debtor
to cover the contract. 37 Financial contracts are also exempt from most
avoidance actions. Transfers made in connection with a financial contract
cannot be avoided as preferences or constructive fraudulent transfers under
federal law.38 They may be avoided only as actual fraudulent transfers (that
is, when made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors).39
26. See id. §§ 726, 1129(b)(2).
27. Id. §§ 506, 725, 1129(b)(2)(A).
28. Id. §§ 545, 546(i).
29. Id. § 510(a).
30. Id. § 553(a).
31. Id. § 546(h).
32. Id. §§ 364, 507, 726.
33. Id. § 365(b)(1).
34. Id. §§ 362(b), 555R557, 559R561.
35. Id. § 546(e)R(g), (j). Bankruptcy law also creates functional priorities for consumer debtors
through property exemptions, section 522, and for creditors through the discharge exceptions,
sections 523, 727, 1328, which encourage repayment of nondischargeable claims.
36. Id. §§ 555R557, 559R561.
37. Id. § 362(b)(6)R(7), (17), (27).
38. Id. § 546(e)R(g), (j).
39. It is unclear whether section 546(e)R(g) and (j) prevents state law fraudulent transfer
lT)K/0* kh HK)KMl)K/0 )+(*)* /+ T+QSK)/+*4 T/22K))QQ* lT)K0g as representatives of the estate. Courts
are split on the issue. Compare Whyte v. Barclays Bank PLC, 494 B.R. 196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(state law fraudulent transfer action brought by litigation trust preempted by section 546(G)), with
In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 499 B.R. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (state law
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Thus, even though the general bankruptcy story is one of mutualization
with an overlay of prioritization, for financial contracts the story is solely
one of prioritization.
B. CLEARINGHOUSES ASRISKMUTUALIZATIONDEVICES
The Bankruptcy Code is not the only loss allocation system that
combines prioritization and mutualization that can be found in federal and
state statutory receiverships for failed financial institutions. 40 Financial
contracts are similarly prioritized in statutory receiverships by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 41 National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), 42 Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC), 43 Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), 44 and state insurance
commissions. 45 While this Article is focused on the bankruptcy safe
harbors, its arguments apply with equal force to the parallel safe harbors in
FDIC, NCUA, SIPC, FHFA, and state insurance company receiverships.
The Dodd-Frank Act takes a different track toward loss allocation than
other statutory loss allocation systems. The Dodd-Frank Act propounds a
mutualization principle, at least for swaps. Specifically, the Dodd-Frank
Act requires most swaps to be cleared through clearinghouses.46 As this
section explains, clearinghouses serve as a risk mutualization device.
Clearinghouses are a type of financial institution that serve as a central
counterparty to transactions. Instead of two counterparties to a contract
making payments directly to each other, they each make their contractual
payments to the clearinghouse, which has assumed the liability for passing
on the payment to the other counterparty. The insertion of the clearinghouse
as a central counterparty is done through contract novation. When two
members of a clearinghouse enter into a transaction that is to be cleared
through the clearinghouse, the clearinghouse is novated into the contract for
each counterparty, meaning that it assumes all of the rights and obligations
of that contract counterparty. The result is to substitute the payment risk of
the clearinghouse for the payment risk of each counterparty to the contract,
fraudulent transfer action brought by Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors not preempted
by § 546(e)), and Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 503 B.R. 348 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (following Tribune, 499 B.R. 310).
40. FDIC, NCUA, FHFA, and state insurance regimes.
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8) (2012) (regular FDIC receiverships); see also id. §
5390(a)(11)(F), (c)(8) (Orderly Liquidation Authority receiverships). FDIC Orderly Liquidation
Authority includes a very limited stay of the termination, liquidation, and acceleration of financial
contracts. Id. § 5390(c)(10)(B).
42. See id. § 1787(c)(8).
43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee(b)(2)(C)(i), 78fff(b) (2012).
44. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(d)(8).
45. INSURER RECEIVERSHIPMODELACT § 711 (NAT4LASS4N. OF INS. COMM4RS 2007). As of
the fourth quarter of 2014, relatively few states had adopted the Insurer Receivership Model Act.
See id. at ST-555-3 to -8.
46. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1682, 1762 (2010)
(codified, respectively, at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) and 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3).
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because each counterparty has the clearinghouse as its formal counterparty
after the novation, rather than its original counterparty.
For example, suppose bank A agrees to sell an asset to bank B. When
banks A and B go take that sale contract to the clearinghouse, it is broken
into two matched contracts: a contract for bank A to sell the asset to the
clearinghouse and a contract for the clearinghouse to sell the same asset to
bank B. Thus, instead of bank A assuming the payment risk of bank B, bank
A has assumed the payment risk of the clearinghouse. Similarly, instead of
bank B assuming the delivery risk of bank A, it has assumed the delivery
risk of the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse substitutes its own risk of
performance for that of each of the counterparties to the contract. For this
service, the clearinghouse will charge a fee and may require the members to
post collateral (Nmargin8 in clearinghouse parlance). Because many
clearinghouses are organized as mutualsPfirms owned by their
customersPclearinghouses price to cover risk, not to maximize profit. 47
Formally, clearinghouses clear only their members4 transactions, but
functionally they clear transactions not just for their members, but also for
)LQK+ 2Q2kQ+*4 T(*)/2Q+*a !learinghouse members will use the
clearinghouse to clear not only transactions for their own account, but also
)+l0*lT)K/0* O/+ )LQK+ T(*)/2Q+*4 lTT/(0)*c jK)L )LQ 2Q2kQ+ 0/'l)QS K0)/
the contract for its customer prior to presenting the contract to the
clearinghouse for clearing. This results in two levels of novation. For
example, if hedge fund X and hedge fund Y enter into a swap, each hedge
fund will take that swap to its brokerage firm (such as banks A and B
above), which will be a clearinghouse member. Each brokerage will be
novated into the swap for its respective hedge fund client and then the
brokerages will clear the swap through the clearinghouse. The
clearinghouse will not know the identity of the ultimate party in interest on
the swap, but will only know that of its members.
Clearinghouses are commonly used in payment systems. The Federal
Reserve Board and various private entities all operate clearinghouses for
checks, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transactions.
MasterCard and Visa operate clearinghouses for debit cards and for credit
cards, as do American Express and Discover. Clearinghouses are also
commonly used in securities and commodities futures transactions. The
National Securities Clearing Corporation, the Fixed Income Clearing
Corporation, and the Options Clearing Corporation clear almost all
transactions in equity securities, debt securities, and equity derivatives,
respectively, while each board of trade has an associated commodities
clearinghouse.
47. See Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J.
445, 451R52 (2013). In other work, I have noted the price transparency benefits of clearinghouses
for their members in contrast to over-the-counter dealer markets. Id. at 452R53.
2015] Prioritization & Mutualization 139
Obviously the replacement of the counterparty risk of the original
counterparty with the counterparty risk of the clearinghouse makes sense if,
and only if, the clearinghouse represents a lower risk. In fact,
clearinghouses do for two reasons. First, clearinghouses have informational
advantages over any individual firm.48 A clearinghouse is often able to see
much more of the market than any individual firm.49 In theory, this gives
clearinghouses an information advantage that they can use to price
efficiently for changes in aggregate market risk. Second, and more
importantly, clearinghouses are an efficient method to reduce counterparty
risk because they have deep, layered capital exceeding that of any member
institution. This is not to say that clearinghouses are necessarily always
well-run, but rather that they have theoretical advantages over the
alternative of over-the-counter clearing through dealers or nonintermediated
clearing.
The nature of clearinghouse capital can be understood by analogy to a
levy designed to withstand floodwaters. The higher the levy and the more
solid its construction, the more severe the flood it can withstand. So too
with capital. The more capital (and the better it is), the greater losses a firm
can absorb without failing.50 While ex ante regulation can help reduce risk-
taking and thus prevent losses, ultimately whether a firm is able to survive
is a function of the amount and type of capital it has. The more capital that
can be deployed as a levy against a storm surge of losses from a firm4s
counterparty4s failure, the greater chance the firm has to survive without
assistance from the government.
Clearinghouses act as levies against financial deluges. The strength of
clearinghouses as levies comes from their complex and deeply layered
capital structures. Whereas a normal firm has only its common equity to
absorb losses, clearinghouses have many other loss absorbers.
Clearinghouses typically require their members to post margin to cover
their exposures as well as to finance a guaranty fund and hold members
liable for capital calls. Moreover, clearinghouse members will require their
own customers to post margin for their trades.51
Although the precise details of capital structures vary by clearinghouse,
typical procedures will have any losses from a default by a customer of a
clearinghouse member first reduced by setoff against a customer4s account
48. Id. at 456R58.
49. Whether this is true depends on the market share of the clearinghouse and of individual
firms and over-the-counter dealers.
50. While capital is often thought of as common stock or perhaps as equity interests in general,
it need not be so narrowly defined, and indeed, is not in banking regulation. Long-term debt,
especially subordinated debt, can be thought of as a type of capital, as a firm with long-term debt
might find itself temporarily insolvent, but not necessarily illiquid, when confronted with large
losses. As long as the firm is able to service its debt, the fact that it is insolvent may not matter, as
the firm may be able to earn its way back into solvency.
51. See Levitin, supra note 47, at 462.
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and any other collateral posted by the customer. If that is insufficientPor if
the transaction is for the member4s own accountPthen the clearinghouse
may engage in setoff and seize collateral from the clearinghouse member4s
proprietary account at the clearinghouse and its contribution to the
clearinghouse4s guaranty fund. Should that prove insufficient, the
clearinghouse may apply other members4 contributions to the guaranty fund
and possibly the margin posted by other members. Only if there are
additional losses will the clearinghouse itself contribute some of its own
funds, while making a capital call on its members, essentially recapitalizing
itself.52
The total financial strength of a clearinghouse is the sum of margin
posted to members, margin posted by members, its guaranty fund, its own
paid in capital, and its callable capital (theoretically until its members4 own
capital is exhausted). Clearinghouses thereby aggregate the capital of their
members making a firm that is (in theory) far stronger and more capable of
absorbing losses than any individual member.
While clearinghouse structures place first loss on the defaulting
member (or member4s customer), any excess losses are ultimately
mutualized through the clearinghouse4s guaranty fund (and other members4
margin), mutually owned capital, and callable capital. Thus, clearinghouses
mutualize extreme losses among their members. 53 Overall, the capital
structure of clearinghouses looks like a mutual insurance system with a very
high deductible. This structure is capable of absorbing significant losses,
but also minimizes the moral hazard of loss mutualization by placing the
first losses on the defaulting member.
II. THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
A. RATIONALE FOR THE SAFEHARBORS
The standard policy rationale for financial contracts4 special treatment
in bankruptcy is that prioritization is necessary to avoid domino effect
systemic risk. According to this rationale, if a debtor is unable to honor its
financial contracts its counterparties would have to (1) incur the delay and
corresponding market risk of the automatic stay, like other creditors, (2)
wait in line for payment with other creditors (if the contract is not
adequately collateralized or subject to setoff rights), (3) risk having their
executory contracts cherry-picked, like other creditors, and (4) risk having
their pre-bankruptcy transactions unwound, like other creditors. The result,
according to the standard explanation, would be greater market uncertainty
52. See id. Some clearinghouses may also be able to access emergency Federal Reserve
liquidity facilities.
53. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15) (2012) fSQOK0K0M l NSQ+K'l)K'Q* THQl+K0M /+Ml0Kgl)K/08 l* l0 Q0)K)h
)Ll) N2()(lHKgQn*m a a a T+QSK) +K*I8 /0 )+l0*lT)K/0* l2/0M K)* -l+)KTK-l0)*ea
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and potentially spillover liquidity problems that could metastasize into
solvency problems for the nondebtor counterparties.
If one accepts this story, and believes that prioritizing finance over
restructuring is a reasonable policy, then it makes sense from a systemic
stability perspective to allow the nondebtor counterparties to terminate,
accelerate, and liquidate their contracts, including seizing and selling any
collateral, and protecting them against most avoidance actions. We might
also tell a more sophisticated version of this story, namely that the safe
harbors are ultimately intended to protect the money supply from
impairment. The bankruptcy safe harbors54 cover two distinct categories of
financial contracts: money substitutes and credit and hedging instruments.55
Some financial contracts, such as Treasury security repos and swaps,
function as money substitutes. These contracts are supposed to be relatively
risk-free as they are used for payment and collateralization and provide the
lubricant for financial markets. While they are not included in traditional
measures of the money supply, they are, for all practical purposes, part of
the money supply. 56 Other financial contracts, such as mortgage repos,
credit default swaps, and forward contracts are credit and hedging
instruments. These instruments are supposed to contain real credit and
market risk.
These different categories of contracts present different policy
concerns. The policy concern for money substitutes is to preserve the
positive market externality of liquidity. Liquidity can be preserved only if
money substitutes are unimpaired. A loss allocation regime such as
bankruptcy is antithetical to the preservation of liquidity. Beyond the
possibility of loss allocation, bankruptcy law impedes liquidity as the
automatic stay delays collection of payments, which are generally not made
until a plan becomes effective or a liquidation is effectuated. Similarly, the
avoidance action safe harbors help ensure the finality of transactions, which
contributes to liquidity by eliminating competing claims to the transferred
assets. Thus, for money substitutes, the safe harbors are intended to
preserve liquidity.
In contrast, the primary policy concern for credit and hedging
instruments is loss allocation. Bankruptcy already provides a loss allocation
regime that successfully handles other credit instrumentsPsuch as loansP
and hedging transactions without the need for the safe harbors. There is no
inherent reason to treat financial contracts that function as credit and
hedging instruments differently from other credit and hedging transactions.
54. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6)R(7), (17), (27), 555R557, 559R561 (2012).
55. Professor Stephen Lubben has similarly distinguished between financing arrangements
(repos) and contracts (derivatives). Stephen J. Lubben, Transaction Simplicity, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 194, 197R98 (2012).
56. See Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(forthcoming 2016).
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Bankruptcy works as a loss allocation regime irrespective of the form of a
transaction. It should not matter that a transaction happens to be in the form
of a swap, repo, forward contract, or security contract, rather than a loan,
asset purchase, or sale contract.
Instead, the reason to give special protection to financial contracts that
function as credit and hedging instruments is because many of them are
used by financial institutions that are also dealers in money substitutes. If
these money dealers were impaired because of loss allocation in bankruptcy
on credit and hedging instruments, it could affect the liquidity of money
substitutes issued by these institutions. Thus, the policy basis for the safe
harbors rests upon protecting money substitutes.
The policy concern animating the bankruptcy safe harbors is to protect
the money supply, which means preserving the liquidity of money
substitutes and thus the solvency of the financial institutions that create
money substitutes. Yet, if the policy goal is to protect the money supply,
there are superior solutions to the bankruptcy safe harbors, namely the
mandatory use of clearinghouses for systemically important classes of
contracts, as discussed below.57
B. THE TENSION BETWEEN SYSTEMICRISK POLICY AND
BANKRUPTCY POLICY
While the safe harbors are intended to reduce systemic risk, they are in
tension with important bankruptcy policy goals, namely maximization of
the value of the debtor4s assets for the benefit of all creditors, orderly
liquidation, preservation of going concern value, and consistent treatment of
economically equivalent transactions.58
The safe harbors impede the maximization of the debtor4s assets for the
value of all creditors by depriving the debtor of optionality regarding which
contracts to assume (and pay in full as post-petition administrative expense
claims) and which to reject (and treat as pre-petition claims). The ability of
nondebtor counterparties to terminate, accelerate, and liquidate their
contracts without regard to the automatic stay means that nondebtor
counterparties can effectively cherry-pick which contracts to see to maturity
and which to exit at current market values.59 In other words, the automatic
57. In other work, I present a radical, yet ultimately conservative alternative, namely,
nationalization of the money creation function. See Levitin, supra note 56. If private financial
institutions were not permitted to engage in money creation, their impairment would not matter
from a systemic perspective. My nationalization proposal would require a wholesale change in the
financial system. In this Article, I focus on a more discrete and, hopefully, feasible reform.
58. See, e.g., Morrison & Riegel, supra note 5; Skeel & Jackson, supra note 8.
59. Derivatives contracts written using the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement will sometimes
allow an out-of-the-money nondebtor counterparty to walk away from the contract upon the
SQk)/+4* OKHK0M O/+ kl0I+(-)Tha 7LK* -+Q*Q0)* l NLQlSs Z jK0c )lKH* h/( H/*Q8 *K)(l)K/0 O/+ )LQ
nondebtor counterparty. The 2002 and 2014 versions of the ISDA Master Agreement do not allow
the walk away option. Instead, the terminated contract is paid out based on its market value, no
matter which counterparty is in the money. Some post-2002 swaps and derivative contracts
2015] Prioritization & Mutualization 143
stay safe harbors mean that the debtor cannot cherry-pick contracts, but
nondebtor counterparties can. Giving nondebtor counterparties this sort of
optionality functions as a penalty that deprives debtors of contracts that are
likely to be more valuable for the estate if held to maturity. A nondebtor4s
termination option also makes it difficult for a debtor with significant
financial contracts to rationally plan a bankruptcy because there is too much
market uncertainty regarding what its counterparties will do.
The possibility of contract termination also threatens to deprive debtors
of part of their going concern valuePthe value that comes from the
synergies of the particular combination of assets in a firm.60 For example,
consider a set of forward contracts for jet fuel that is carefully matched to
an airline4s anticipated fuel usage. The forward contracts may have value in
other parties4 hands, but their particular value as a hedge is unique to the
airline, contributing to the airline4s going concern value. Similarly, a credit
default swap on the debt of the airline4s major parts supplier functions as a
type of insurance policy against supply disruptions due to the supplier4s
financial problems. The hedging value of that swap is particular to the
airline, just as the hedging value of Julia Robert4s insurance policy on her
smile is particular to Julia Roberts and her future earning ability.61
Not all financial contracts contribute to going concern valuePfor
example, an option to purchase the stock of a firm in an unrelated industry
does not add any obvious going concern value beyond some notional
diversification. At least some financial contracts, however, contribute to
going concern value and the automatic stay safe harbors deprive the estate
of this value. Even if financial contracts can ultimately be terminated by
nondebtor counterparties, the delay imposed by the automatic stay gives the
debtor time to maximize the value of the assets, such as by arranging to
have another party novated into the contract (via assumption and
assignment).62
The safe harbors are also in tension with bankruptcy4s fairness tenet
that two transactions that are economically equivalent should be treated the
continue to be written using the 1992 documentation; the extent to which the older documentation
continues to be used is uncertain. The 2002 and 2014 versions of the ISDA Master Agreement are
fairer regarding the treatment of debtors in terminated contracts. Nonetheless, termination can still
deprive a debtor of significant value, as termination payments are made at current market values,
rather than based on market value at maturity. Termination thus relieves both counterparties of the
+K*I /O *(k*Q,(Q0) 2l+IQ) 2/'Q2Q0)c k() kQTl(*Q )Q+2K0l)K/0 K* */HQHh )LQ 0/0SQk)/+4* /-)K/0c )LQ
right to terminate benefits the nondebtor counterparty, not the debtor.
60. Going concern value is the value of a firm as a going concern over and above the liquidation
value of its assets.
61. NF L@1< \*" J!XX!@A ;@@:RG N8X!E1< \(D J!XX!@A /B!X' EA) J@>' OA<8>') /:E> ;@)R 2E>:<,
PEOPLE (Mar. 18, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.people.com/people/gallery/0,,20908885_13,00.htm
l#30311261.
62. Such delay can also potentially protect nondebtor counterparties by reducing the chances
of all counterparties terminating their contracts simultaneously and then flooding the market with
seized collateral thereby pushing down the market price of the collateral and reducing the
counterparties4 recoveries.
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same.63 The avoidance action safe harbors undermine this principle. An
unperfected secured loan may be avoided as a fraudulent transfer, but a repo
may not, despite the repo being economically indistinguishable. 64 A
preferential grant of additional collateral for an existing security interest
may be avoided, but not if that additional collateral has been posted as
margin for a swap. 65 A guaranty issued by an insolvent debtor of the
payment of its subsidiary for a bank loan may be avoided as a fraudulent
transfer, but not a guaranty by an insolvent debtor of the payment of its
subsidiary for notes issued to underwriters in a private placement of
securities.66
Irrespective of whether the safe harbors are a good idea, they are
fundamentally in tension with a range of bankruptcy policies. The
prioritization of financial contracts reflects a subordination of bankruptcy
policy to systemic risk policy. Accordingly, to the extent systemic risk
concerns can be addressed through other policies, it is possible to eliminate
the safe harbors and thus the subordination of bankruptcy policy to systemic
risk policy.
C. CRITICISMS OF THE SAFEHARBORS
Existing scholarship has heavily (and rightly) criticized the financial
contract safe harbors. The literature has made several critiques. First, the
safe harbors are overly broad and cover contracts that do not actually
present systemic risk.67 For example, forward contracts for the sale of white
fish to ensure a steady gefilte fish supply during Passover68 do not seem to
merit special treatment based on systemic risk considerations, yet they
nonetheless receive it.
Second, the safe harbors are vulnerable to abuse because of courts4
intensely literal reading of the Bankruptcy Code to elevate form over
economic function.69 Secured loans, for example, can be recast as financial
63. See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 8. To be sure, not all economically equivalent
transactions are treated identically by bankruptcy law. For example, a sale-leaseback or a ground
lease can be economically equivalent to a secured loan, but will not be treated as one (and indeed
might be subject to the § 502(b)(6) claim cap on leases). 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2012).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(f). A repo is an agreement for the sale and repurchase of a security.
The security is functionally collateral for a loan made by the seller, with the difference between
the sale and repurchase price being equivalent to a finance charge.
65. Id. § 546(g).
66. Id. § 546(e).
67. See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 8.
68. See Matt A.V. Chaban, Gefilte Fish Is Scarce This Passover. Taste Buds Are Ambivalent,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2014, at A1 (noting that Manischewitz, the largest producer of gefilte fish in
the world, avoided a whitefish shortage in 2014 because it buys its fish a year in advance on
forward contracts).
69. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Am.
Life Ins. Co. (In re Quebecor World (U.S.A.), Inc.), 719 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2013); Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2011); QSI
Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571 F.3d 545, 550R51 (6th Cir.
2015] Prioritization & Mutualization 145
contracts, either as repos or as matched forward contracts.70 Nonetheless,
courts have refused to look at the economic reality of the transactions and
concentrated instead on their form.
Third, some scholars have argued that the safe harbors from the
automatic stay (but not from avoidance actions) for financial contracts is
ineffective at reducing systemic risk and can instead have the opposite
effect. The automatic stay exceptions encourage runs that can destabilize
the market.71 If too many creditors terminate their contracts and liquidate
their collateral at the same time, the market becomes flooded with
collateral, jLKTL SQ-+Q**Q* )LQ 'lH(Q /O )LQ T/HHl)Q+lH l0S )L(* T+QSK)/+*4
recoveries.72 As a result, creditors actually incur greater losses due to the
safe harbors. Likewise, the presence of the safe harbors discourages active
monitoring by the creditors on financial contracts, who assume they can
always grab their collateral in the event of a bankruptcy, but may thus allow
the debtor to assume much more risk than they would otherwise.73
Finally, the assumption of the bankruptcy safe harbors, as well as the
Dodd-Frank Act, is that systemic risk resides solely within financial
institutions. Yet, this is obviously not true. For example, the failure of
major industrial firms like General Motors or Chrysler posed a serious
threat to the United States economy not because of financial institutions4
exposure, but because of the exposure of employees, retirees, and
suppliers.74 Similarly, the bailout of the nation4s airlines after September
11, 2001 and the nationalization of the United States4 passenger rail system
in 1970 both point to the systemic importance of common carriers in the
national economy.75 The safe harbors privilege financial institutions over
the real (nonfinancial) economy as a locus of systemic risk. Favoring
financial institutions in this manner potentially exacerbates systemic risk
when losses are shifted from financial institutions to other systemically
important creditors and counterparties or when they result in the liquidation
of firms essential for the smooth operation of the national economy.
2009); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 986R87 (8th Cir. 2009); Calyon N.Y.
Branch v. Am. Home Mortg. Corp. (In re Am. Home Mortg., Inc.), 379 B.R. 503, 507R08 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2008); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Z0)4Hc Inc. (In re Resorts Z0)4Hc Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d
Cir. 1999). But seeMunford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610
(11th Cir. 1996) (requiring beyond the plain language of the statute that a financial institution
have a beneficial interest in transferred funds or securities for safe harbor to apply).
70. See Stephen L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives:
A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1750R51 (2014); Michael
Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 282 (2011).
71. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 7, at 94.
72. See Lubben, supra note 7, at 331R32.
73. See Roe, supra note 7 (addressing avoidance action safe harbors, but focusing on the
automatic stay safe harbors).
74. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 453R56 (2011).
75. Id. at 454, 460.
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The first two criticisms suggest narrower definitions of financial
contracts, rather than outright elimination of the special treatment. Implicit
in these critiques is that special treatment of these contracts is merited to the
extent that it prevents systemic risk.
In contrast, scholars who suggest that the automatic stay safe harbors
actually exacerbate systemic risk, either by encouraging runs or
discouraging monitoring, posit empirical claims. There is much to
commend the theoretical analysis that supports these claims, as well as the
experience of some specific cases, most notably Lehman Brothers4
bankruptcy. 76 Nonetheless, absent empirical proof, it is impossible to
definitively gainsay the finance industry4s claim that the safe harbors do
generally reduce risk and require, at most, tweaks. Moreover, the criticisms
of the safe harbors4 ineffectiveness are primarily targeted at the automatic
stay safe harbors, not the avoidance action safe harbors.77
Whereas the prior literature emphasizes either the overbreadth or the
ineffectiveness of the special treatment of financial contracts in bankruptcy,
this Article instead emphasizes the redundancy of the special bankruptcy
treatment. To the extent that certain financial contracts present a particular
elevated type of systemic risk, clearinghouses already address those risks,
making the bankruptcy safe harbors unnecessary. As the following section
explains, clearinghouses are not merely an alternative method of dealing
with systemic risk, but are in fact a superior method to the bankruptcy safe
harbors. The redundancy of systemic risk protections means that the
bankruptcy safe harbors could be eliminated without increasingPand
possibly decreasingPsystemic risk. It is possible to have the best of both
worlds: good systemic risk policy and good bankruptcy policy. Systemic
risk prevention does not need to come at the expense of bankruptcy (or
more generally, insolvency) policy.
III. CLEARINGHOUSES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR THE
BANKRUPTCY SAFE HARBORS
A.MUTUALIZATION AS SYSTEMICRISK POLICY
Mutualization of risk via clearinghouses is a superior method of
addressing systemic risk than prioritization via bankruptcy. Mutualization
spreads losses across the financial services industry, which is appropriate
given the role interconnectedness plays in systemic risk.
Interconnectedness is not the only source of systemic risk, but it is an
important aspect of it. This can be seen from the 2008 financial crisis. In
76. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J.
ECON. PERSP. 29 (2011).
77. But see Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 123, 131 (2010) (noting that the automatic stay is only effective at preventing runs on the
debtor when coupled with an anti-preference provision).
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2008, AIG was bailed out not because it was so important in itself, but
because of the spillover risk posed to its counterparties; if AIG had failed,
its swap counterparties might themselves have failed. Similarly, if Morgan
Stanley had failed, its clearing bank, JPMorgan Chase might well have
failed, which would have brought down the other banks, such as Goldman
Sachs, that used JPMorgan Chase as their clearing bank.
Because of the interconnected nature of systemic risk, it is impossible
to articulate the precise modicum of risk that is created by a particular
financial institution4s activities. Therefore, mutualizing the costs of
systemic risk to the entire financial services industry is an entirely
appropriate response.78 Such mutualization of risk based on the scale of
transactional activity will result in some internalization of systemic
externalities and thereby reduce the incentive to engage in excessively risky
transactions.79 It is not a perfect or precise measure, but it is a reasonable
one for addressing the systemic risk that arises from the interconnectedness
of the financial services industry.80 In any event, risk internalization within
the financial services industry is far fairer than a system of prioritization
that shifts risk to unadjusting, unsecured creditors, including tort and tax
creditors.
By its very nature, mutualization reduces the need for bailouts. In
theory with mutualization, the aggregate capital of an entire industry can be
deployed to stanch losses before government funds need be deployed. And,
if a bailout is necessary, it may be politically easier to bailout an entire
industry, rather than a particular firm because it is easier for the public to
understand the need to support a broad sector of the economy and a sector-
wide bailout does not appear to play favorites or reward specific bad actors.
Moreover, industry-wide bailouts let the government avoid the political
problem of picking winners and losers in the market. Indeed, another of the
Dodd-Frank Act4s reforms attempts to prohibit individual firm bailouts
under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.81
Mutualization of risk is, in general, the policy preferred by the Dodd-
Frank Act. Another Dodd-Frank Act provision establishes an Orderly
78. The danger of free riding in this mutualized risk system is reduced, however, because
clearinghouses im-/*Q OK+*) H/**Q* /0 )LQ SQOl(H)K0M 2Q2kQ+ f/+ 2Q2kQ+4* T(*)/2Q+ea =0Hh
extreme losses get mutualized based on the scale of transactional activity. The concentration of
first losses on the defaulting member reduces the incentive to free ride off of mutualized risk. A
THQl+K0ML/(*Q jKHH /0Hh 2()(lHKgQ +K*I jLQ0 l 2Q2kQ+ f/+ 2Q2kQ+4* T(*)/2Q+e K* K0*/H'Q0)a
79. Clearinghouses are also capable of pricing ex ante for the risk posed by its aggregate
exposures to a member. This would force the internalization of some of the costs of being too-big-
to-fail on those larger clearinghouse members.
80. 7LK* */+) /O 2()(lHKgl)K/0 lH+QlSh QiK*)* 'Kl 2()(lH K0*(+l0TQ O(0S*c *(TL l* )LQ ]pZ!4*
pQ-/*K) Z0*(+l0TQ ](0Sa !/0)+l+h )/ -/-(Hl+ kQHKQOc )LQ ]pZ!4* pQ-/*K) Z0*(+l0TQ Fund is not
guaranteed by the United States government, but is, instead, a mutual insurance fund for the
financial services industry. See Levitin, supra note 56, at 25 n.49.
81. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 343(3) (2012)).
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Liquidation Fund funded by assessments on systemically important
financial institutions. 82 The Orderly Liquidation Fund is to be used to
finance the liquidation of systemically important financial institutions.
Thus, systemically important financial institutions are required to finance
what is essentially a mutual DIP loan fund 83 (or perhaps more aptly
described as a required subscription to a mutual burial society).
B. MANDATING CLEARINGHOUSES FOR ALL SYSTEMICALLY
SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTION CLASSES
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates use of clearinghouses only for swaps84
and allows for regulatory exemption of certain swaps, including those
undertaken by small financial institutions and hedging transactions where
one of the counterparties is not a financial institution.85 The logic of the
Dodd-Frank Act, however, is not restricted to swaps. Instead, it extends to
all systemically important types of financial contracts.
Many types of financial contracts already clear through clearinghouses
even without a statutory requirement to do so. All commodities futures
contracts go through clearinghouses affiliated with boards of trade.
Similarly, all exchange-traded securities contracts clear through
clearinghouses. For these contracts the bankruptcy safe harbors are already
redundant. In the event a counterparty files for bankruptcy, it is the
clearinghouse that will be the real creditor, not the nondebtor counterparty.
There are, however, other types of financial contracts that do not go
through clearinghouses. Securities repos, mortgage repos, forward contracts
(other than commodities futures), and non-exchange-traded securities
contracts do not generally clear through clearinghouses.
Repos present a particularly large market in money substitute claims.
Repo clearing splits into three distinct markets. First, approximately 17% of
repos are partially cleared through a clearinghouse.86 General Collateral
Finance (GCF) repos are a blind-brokered interdealer market of repos
collateralized by a range of Treasury and Agency securities.87 The starting
leg (the purchase transaction) in a GCF repo clears bilaterally, but the
82. Id. § 210; 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n)R(o).
83. A Debtor in Possession, or DIP loan, is a loan made under 11 U.S.C. § 364 to provide fi-
nancing to a company in bankruptcy.
84. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723, 763.
85. Id. See also CFTC Exceptions to the Clearing Requirement, 17 C.F.R. § 50.50 (2013)
(regulatory implementation of commodity-based swaps exemption). As of the second quarter of
2015, the SEC had still not promulgated a final rule for equity-based swaps clearance.
86. Adam Copeland et al., Mapping and Sizing the U.S. Repo Market, FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y.: LIBERTY ST. ECON. (June 25, 2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/06/
mapping-and-sizing-the-us-repo-market.html#.VVoCP2TONBc (quotient of the sum of GCF for
repo and reverse repo over the sum of all repo and reverse repo transactions).
87. Adam Copeland et al., Key Mechanics of the U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market, FED. RES. BANK
OFN.Y.: ECON. POL4Y REV. 20 (Nov. 2012), http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/12v18n3/1210co
pe.pdf.
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closing leg (the repurchase transaction) clears through the Fixed Income
Clearing Corporation.88 Second, another 29% of securities repos are tri-
party repos 89 that clear through one of two clearing banksPJPMorgan
Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.90 85% of tri-party repos are of
Treasury or Agency securities.91 Third, the remaining 54% of the repo
market is in uncleared bilateral repos.92 Many of these bilateral repos are
reverse repos. Reverse repos are often the form by which broker-dealers
make loans to their prime brokerage clients. That is, many of these
uncleared repos are loans from banks to hedge funds.
Therefore, repos and all other types of systemically important financial
contracts should be required to clear through clearinghouses. This includes
repos of exchange-traded securitiesPespecially of Treasury securities.
Because of their roles as repo clearing banks, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of
New York Mellon are singular nodes of systemic risk. Unlike
clearinghouses, these clearing banks engage in a host of activities unrelated
to clearing that pose a risk to their ability to honor their clearing
commitments. They also lack the layered capital structure of
clearinghouses.
These clearing banks are inherently too-big-to-fail because their failure
would bring down the entire tri-party repo market and thus the securities
lending industry. The result is to encourage excessive risk-taking by these
banks. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has worked with these
banks to reduce their intraday repo exposure, but their risk has only been
reduced, not eliminated.93 To truly address systemic risk in the repo market
these banks should be required to spin-off their clearing operations into
mutual clearinghouse corporations.
Not all types of financial contracts, however, are systemically important
as a class. For nonsystemically important types of financial contracts there
is no reason to require the use of clearinghouses or to protect them with the
bankruptcy safe harbors.94 Thus, forward contracts for physical delivery
(i.e., that are not commodities futures) are inherently bespoke contracts that
88. See Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade, The Repurchase Agreement Refined: GCF
Repo, 9 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 3 (June 2003),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci9-6.pdf.
89. Adam Copeland et al., supra note 86 (quotient of tri-party repo over the sum of all repo
and reverse repo transactions).
90. Adam Copeland et al., supra note 87, at 21.
91. Id. at 20.
92. Adam Copeland et al., supra note 86 (quotient of the sum of bilateral for repo and reverse
repo over the sum of all repo and reverse repo transactions).
93. See Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
94. The American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11
Ll* *K2KHl+Hh -+/-/*QS QiTH(SK0M N/+SK0l+h *(--Hh T/0)+lT)*8 O+/2 )LQ *lOQ Ll+k/+*a AM. BANKR.
INST., COMM4N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, FINAL REP. & RECOMMENDATIONS 107
fF_GCea 7LQ #"Z !/22K**K/04* -+/-/*lH l--HKQ* )/ N0/0SQlHQ+ T/(0)Q+-l+)KQ* )/ -Lh*KTlH *(--Hh
T/0)+lT)*a8 Id.
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do not pose systemic risk implications in any individual bankruptcy because
of their limited scale. If Manischewitz is not able to terminate, accelerate,
and liquidate its forward contract for whitefish, the skies will not fall any
more than if a large public utility company has to wait through a bankruptcy
before collecting on its forward contract for electricity generation.
Similarly, private-placements of securities do not pose any greater systemic
risk than syndicated leveraged loans, which are not covered by the safe
harbors (and indeed, the syndicated leveraged loans might in fact be more
liquid in secondary markets). Lastly, bilateral mortgage reposPthe
preferred funding vehicle for nonbank subprime lendersPare just secured
warehouse lines of credit with collateralized mortgages. There is nothing
inherently systemic about these secured loans.
There is a fairly easy test of determining which contracts are
systemically important and should be cleared via clearinghouses and which
are not. Central clearing is only practical on relatively common and
homogeneous financial instruments, such as the Treasury and Agency
securities accepted as GCF. This is because it is too difficult and costly for
a clearinghouse to accurately price and margin bespoke contracts. To the
extent that financial contracts are not sufficiently homogeneous and
common for central clearing to be practical, these contracts are unlikely to
present a systemic risk.
While such heterogeneous contracts can individually and collectively
reflect large positions, such as JPMorgan Chase4s infamous multi-billion
NLondon Whale8 trade,95 they are unlikely to be systemically important
precisely because they are heterogeneous. Problems with heterogeneous
contracts are unlikely to result in liquidity-contracting panics because
markets recognize that the contracts are unique. Such heterogeneous
contracts are already themselves illiquid and therefore not exposed to
liquidity risks, just as they are unlikely to suffer from correlation risk
because they are unique.
By way of analogy, heterogeneous contracts are like a genetically
diverse population. Such a genetically diverse population is more likely to
avoid a catastrophic collapse when confronted with a pathogen than a
homogenous population. The entire homogenous population either has
immunity to the pathogen or it does not. If it does not, the entire population
might be wiped out. It is a binary outcome. In contrast, immunity will vary
within the genetically heterogeneous population. While there might be
mortality in the heterogeneous population, it is less likely to have complete
mortality than a homogeneous population. The same is true of contracts.
Homogeneous contracts have correlation and liquidity risks that do not exist
for heterogeneous contracts.
95. See Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2015, 12:09 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the-london-whale.
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Heterogeneous contracts thus might actually be collectively saferPthat
is systemically saferPthan homogenous contracts. Accordingly, there is no
good policy reason to give these contracts special treatment in bankruptcy.
The universe of mandatory clearing should match the universe of
systemically significant transaction classes. Thus, we come to a situation in
which systemically important contracts should be cleared through
clearinghouses and nonsystemically important contracts should be left
uncleared. Neither systemically important nor systemically unimportant
contracts should benefit from special treatment in bankruptcy because the
distortionary effects of the special treatment are unnecessary to achieve the
policy goal of reducing systemic risk.
C. CLEARINGHOUSERISK ANDREGULATION
When a clearinghouse is used to clear a contract, it becomes the
debtor4s counterparty to the contract as of the Nacceptance date8 when the
clearinghouse is novated to the contract.96 From that point on, if the debtor
files for bankruptcy, it is the clearinghouse that is the creditor. The systemic
risk reduction argument for the bankruptcy safe harbors does not apply to
clearinghouses when they stand as creditors. This is because of
clearinghouses4 deep, layered capital and access to emergency liquidity
sources. A clearinghouse can afford to absorb the losses caused by delay
and even debtor cherry-picking, as those losses will ultimately be
mutualized among its members. The clearinghouse is likely to have
additional protection from margin posted by the debtor for all contracts and
from common law rights of setoff (without need for a master netting
agreement).97 Therefore, even if a clearinghouse member were to fail, the
clearinghouse4s net exposure would likely be substantially smaller than the
aggregate of the member4s positions.
Similarly, clearinghouses do not need the benefit of the avoidance
action safe harbors. It is unclear whether a clearinghouse would have
liability for avoidance actions, even in the absence of the safe harbors. In
many instances, they are secondary transferees that take in good faith for
value or tertiary good faith transferees. 98 In some situations the
clearinghouse might be the formal initial transferee, but given that it has no
more than momentary beneficial ownership of the transferred property, its
96. Acceptance dates are often only shortly before payment is due, but there is no inherent
reason that has to be the case. Extending acceptance dates farther out would impose more risk on
clearinghouses by increasing the period for which they would have liability on the cleared
contracts and would require more margin/higher pricing, but that is not an inherent problem, as it
is a risk that could be priced.
97. Conceivably, however, to make the setoff right meaningful, clearinghouses might require a
limited safe harbor under the Bankruptcy Code to allow them to engage in triangular setoff or
/)LQ+ )h-Q* /O N*H/--h8 *Q)/OO jK)L/() +QMl+S )/ )LQ -l+)KT(Hl+ KSQ0)K)KQ* /O T/(0)Q+-l+)KQ* jK)LK0 l
corporate group, if they would have the right to do so under non-bankruptcy law.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2012).
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role in the transaction might well be disregarded.99 In any case, to the extent
a clearinghouse had liability for an avoidance action, it would presumably
be indemnified by the nondebtor counterparty because clearinghouses are in
no position to undertake diligence of individual transactions.100
While clearinghouses are systemic risk absorbers with deep, layered
capital, they are also concentrated nodes of risk within the financial system,
and, if poorly managed, can increase systemic risk. 101 Indeed,
clearinghouses can themselves become too-big-to-fail.
The too-big-to-fail problem is less concerning for clearinghouses,
however, for several reasons. First, the deep capital of clearinghouses
makes them much less likely to fail from credit losses than any individual
institution. In theory, a clearinghouse can call on all of the capital of its
members. Thus, strong institutions support the weak through the
clearinghouse.
The real risk with clearinghouses is operational risk, not credit risk. If a
clearinghouse4s computer system went down or malfunctioned and the
clearinghouse failed to timely perform on its obligations, it could incur
significant liability. Operational risk affects all institutions, and can
conceivably be covered by insurance, but clearinghouses do pose a
magnified risk of operational failure.102 Access to the Federal Reserve4s
discount window for clearinghouses designated as systemically important
lessens the risk of a clearinghouse operational failure causing a systemic
crisis.103
Second, clearinghouses are not leveraged institutions. Clearinghouses
are not generally borrowing funds, although they do often have revolving
lines of credit, but are instead running matched books of highly liquid
contracts.104 Accordingly, clearinghouses are much less likely to become
insolvent than individual leveraged firms, such as banks or broker-dealers.
99. 3LKHQ THQl+K0ML/(*Q*c HKIQ )LQ ]QSQ+lH :Q*Q+'Q4* ]QS3K+Q *h*)Q2c Ll'Q kQQ0 )+Ql)QS l*
real intermediaries for the purposes of section 546 jurisprudence, that section of the Bankruptcy
Code is bound by its language and the associated broad definitions. Section 550, in contrast, uses
)LQ (0SQOK0QS )Q+2 /O N)+l0*OQ+QQa8 # T/(+) 2KML) jQHH H//I l) )LQ QT/0/2KT +QlHK)h /O )LQ
transaction and consider a clearinghouse a pass-through entity to be disregarded, much as the
^HQ'Q0)L !K+T(K)4* 2K0/+Kty jurisprudence on section 546 holds. See Munford v. Valuation
Research Corp. (In reMunford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996).
100. In this regard, clearinghouses raise a similar issue to claims trading.
101. See Levitin, supra note 47; Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV.
1641 (2013) (arguing that clearinghouses may increase systemic risk by pushing it outside the
realm of cleared transactions).
102. See Huberto M. Ennis & David A. Price, Discount Window Lending: Policy Trade-offs and
the 1985 BoNY Computer Failure (Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, Econ. Brief 15-05, 2015),
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_brief/201
5/pdf/eb_15-05.pdf.
103. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5463, 5465 (2012).
104. See Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 857
(2014). If the revolver is with a member that fails, the revolver will not be available to provide
liquidity to the clearinghouse, but clearinghouses designated as systemically important can access
)LQ ]QSQ+lH :Q*Q+'Q4* SK*T/(0) jK0S/ja See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5463, 5465.
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Third, because clearinghouses are mutuals with callable capital, they
price solely to cover risk, not to generate a profit. This means that
clearinghouses lack the lopsided incentive for excessive risk-taking created
by limited shareholder liability. It also means that clearinghouses are
capable of pricing for the counterparty size. The larger a clearinghouse
member is, the greater the risk to the clearinghouse from that individual
member failing. This incentivizes clearinghouses to price adversely for
member size, essentially creating a market-based too-big-to-fail penalty on
larger financial institutions. Such pricing would reduce clearinghouse
members4 incentive to be large in order to capture too-big-to-fail benefits.
Fourth, it is technically easier to bail out a clearinghouse than other
financial institutions. While bailouts are disfavored, they are nonetheless an
important tool for addressing systemic riskPnot all of which can be
eliminated through ex ante regulation. 105 Accordingly, the feasibility of
bailouts is an important consideration when evaluating the systemic risk
posed by an institution.
It is easier to bailout clearinghouses because they have simpler
corporate and financial structures than other financial institutions. A
clearinghouse4s obligations are basically limited to the contracts it clears;
the clearinghouse is not leveraged. There are not complicated regulatory or
contractual issues to navigate when recapitalizing a clearinghouse. Nor is
there a business model problem if a clearinghouse fails. A clearinghouse
will fail because it misprices for the risk it assumes, but for no other reason.
Thus, there are relatively few operational issues to address with a failed
clearinghouse.
Finally, it is much easier politically to bail out a failed clearinghouse
because it is essentially a utility that benefits an entire sector of the
economy, rather than a privately owned firm. A clearinghouse will only fail
after its members have already kicked in additional capital, and at that point
a government bailout is appropriate, as it is about ensuring continued
economic stability, rather than benefitting private parties.
Still, ensuring that clearinghouses are well managed and provide fair
and equal access for all parties is critical if they are to be relied upon to
reduce systemic risk.106 A system based on poorly regulated clearinghouses
is a recipe for disaster. Accordingly, a major regulatory task is designing a
prudential regulatory system for clearinghouses that will ensure that
clearinghouse governance prioritizes risk management, rather than
expansion of market share. How to optimize clearinghouse governance and
risk management is beyond the scope of this Article.
105. See Levitin, supra note 74, at 439R40.
106. See Levitin, supra note 47, at 466.
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CONCLUSION
The existence of clearinghouses for systemically important types of
financial contracts renders the bankruptcy safe harbors for financial
contracts redundant. Clearinghouses represent a superior method of
addressing systemic risk concerns than the safe harbors because they are an
efficient and fair risk transfer device. Clearinghouses4 ability to aggregate
capital across the financial services industry makes them better suited for
absorbing losses than any individual firm and their ability to price for scale
of exposures and mutualization of losses according to scale of transactional
activity helps ensure the internalization of systemic externalities. This
Article has proposed eliminating the bankruptcy safe harbors for all
financial contracts. All systemically important contracts should be cleared
via clearinghouses. Those contracts that are not susceptible to centralized
clearing are not systemically important and therefore not deserving of the
privileged bankruptcy treatment.
Eliminating the safe harbors would undo the subordination of
bankruptcy policy to systemic risk policy. It would also undo the potentially
counterproductive effects of the safe harbors, namely the encouragement of
runs, fire sales, the discouragement of creditor monitoring, and the
prioritization of financial creditors over potentially more critical real
economy creditors. With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act4s swap
clearing mandate, there is no longer a good justification for the bankruptcy
safe harbors for financial contracts. It is time to eliminate the safe harbors
entirely and to mandate that the few remaining types of uncleared, but
systemically important contractsPsuch as securities reposPbe placed on
clearinghouses.
